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COMMENTS
The Unanswered Question from Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Randolph: How Much is Too
Much Before the Costs of Arbitration Become
a Barrier to Due Process?
I. INTRODUCTION.
The use of mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts
by corporations has experienced a tremendous rise in popularity.' The
rise in growth is usually attributed to the assumption that businesses
favor the lower costs of arbitration, passing the cost savings onto con-
sumers. Arbitration proponents also advocate the process "as a faster,
less expensive procedure, [that] may enable employees to bring claims
that would not be litigated because of the cost of going to court."3
1. See, e.g., Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999)
("The use of arbitration clauses in form contracts is undergoing an explosive expansion.").
Similarly, general use of arbitration to resolve disputes has recently surged in popularity. The
American Arbitration Association (AAA) estimates that it has administered approximately
1,693,431 cases since its founding in 1926 (one year after the enactment of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)), with 448,723 of those cases being filed between 1994 and 1999. Brief of Amicus
Curiae of the American Arbitration Association at 2, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235). AAA also estimates that the number of arbitration cases it
administered increased from 62,423 cases in 1995 to 140,188 cases in 1999. Id. at 8-9 ("These
figures bear witness to a dramatic surge in the popularity of arbitration as a means of resolving
disputes in the United States.").
2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 90-91 (2001). The author hypothesizes the
following possible explanations that a business may assert regarding the potential cost savings of
arbitration: (1) the lack of juries may reduce the likelihood of high damages awards against the
corporation; (2) the company may experience less adverse publicity due to the confidential nature
of arbitration; (3) the national uniform set of arbitral procedures allows an interstate business to
save costs it would normally encounter adapting to different rules in different states; (4)
"arbitration's finality (near absence of appellate review) saves businesses the costs of appeals;" (5)
arbitration may eliminate the possibility of class action suits against the corporation; (6)
arbitration can deter claims against businesses by requiring consumer-plaintiffs to pay the costs of
arbitration; and (7) "arbitration can reduce the amount of discovery available to consumer-
plaintiffs, thus reducing the amount of time and money businesses must spend on the discovery
process and also making it harder for consumers to prove their claims." Id. at 90 (footnotes and
quotations omitted).
3. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions Gilmer
Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 589, 597 (2001) (citing Roberto Corrada,
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Recent court cases provide support that perhaps there is not necessarily
such a savings.4 Further, these cases suggest that when a consumer
actually brings a claim against a corporation, forced arbitration clauses
may end up costing the consumer more than if they had litigated the
matter.
This Casenote will first discuss the history of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA), and will then proceed to a brief look at Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.5 Although Gilmer did not include a complaint
about arbitration costs, the Gilmer Court delineated some basic princi-
ples underlying the enforceability of arbitration contracts and proce-
dures.6 These basic principles lay the groundwork for the other cases
discussed within this Casenote. Next, the Casenote will analyze the
decisions of various circuits since the Gilmer decision concerning
whether fee-shifting or fee-splitting clauses in mandatory arbitration
agreements are enforceable, culminating with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph.7
Green Tree provided an excellent opportunity for the Supreme
Court to address the growing concern that the costs of arbitration may be
interfering with a consumer's due process protections, an opportunity
the Court failed to seize.8 Lastly, this Casenote will conclude that any
amount charged by an arbitrator is too much if the costs are forced on a
prospective plaintiff, and that either one of two changes is necessary to
deal with this growing problem: (1) the courts should follow the lead
taken by the court in Cole v. Burns International Security Services,9 and
hold that any mandatory fee-shifting or fee-splitting clause that is silent
as to costs should be construed against the business, forcing the business
to shoulder the costs of arbitration; or (2) Congress should amend the
Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENv. U. L. REv.
1051, 1051-52 (1996) ("Employer advocates routinely make this point."); Catherine Hagen,
Remarks at the Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Meeting Association of American Law Schools
Sections on Employment Discrimination Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Jan. 7, 1997), 1
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 269, 278 (1997); Martin J Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone,
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Are an Effective Alternative to Employment Litigation, Disp.
RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 19, 22).
4. See, e.g., Knepp, 229 B.R. at 828 ("Our legal system allows the weakest members of our
society a means to file a complaint ... and an opportunity to be heard. Arbitration, however,
requires an initial payment of a minimum of $500.00 to more than $7,000 and daily costs of
hundreds of dollars with no guaranteed due process .... ").
5. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
7. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 3, at 619 ("[T]he Court in Green Tree totally failed to
consider the systematic effects of the agreement's silence concerning the costs of arbitration.").
9. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468.
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FAA, perhaps by incorporating some of the policies of the American
Arbitration Association's Consumer Arbitration Rules,' ° thereby making
the FAA more plaintiff-friendly.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act.
One of the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act is to "mov[e] the
parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible."' "I Originally enacted in 1925, the FAA
was reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title IX of the United States
Code. 12 One of the main purposes of the FAA "was to reverse the long-
standing judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that has existed at
English common law and had been adopted by American courts,"' 3 "and
to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts."' 4
The Supreme Court has noted that the FAA's "primary substantive
provision" is Section 2, which states that "a written provision in ... a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 5 Section
10. See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
11. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 85-86 (footnote omitted) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1980)).
12. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). See also Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 644-73 (1996) (outlining and analyzing the policy, purpose,
and scope of the FAA from its enactment in 1925 through 1996).
13. See Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV., 1191, 1196 n.36
(2001) (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25). The article quotes the following language from an FAA
congressional report:
[T]he courts [have] felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned
without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule [that
arbitration agreements should not be strictly enforced] and recognized its illogical
nature and the injustice which results from it. The bill declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal
courts for their enforcement.
Id. at 1196 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985
(2d Cir. 1942) ("explaining in detail the traditional judicial attitude toward the arbitration of
disputes")).
14. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974)). The Supreme Court has
held that "arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties." Pitchford v. Oakwood
Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (W.D.Va. 2000) (quoting First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)).
15. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Section I of the FAA provides in part
that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
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3 of the FAA provides for stays of proceedings in federal courts when an
issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration; and Section 4 provides
for orders compelling arbitration when one party has failed, neglected,
or refused to comply with an arbitration agreement.' 6  The Supreme
Court has also noted that these provisions of the FAA "manifest a 'lib-
eral federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' ",J
Notwithstanding the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme Court
"was initially hesitant to force arbitration of a statutory claim when a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement was at issue."' 8 The Court elucidated
its reluctance in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 9 by delineating the
following faults with the arbitration system: (1) "arbitrators may lack
the specialized competence the courts possess to hear, understand, and
appreciate constitutional and statutory issues;"2" (2) the "informality of
arbitral procedure ...makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for
final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts;"'2' (3) "arbitra-
tors are not required to issue written opinions when making their deci-
sions; ' 22 and (4) "an imbalance of power is present in arbitrations due to
'the union's exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an
individual grievance is presented. 23
After the Alexander decision in 1974, little doubt remained that
federal statutory disputes would be resolved solely in a judicial forum.24
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2001).
16. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
17. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1980)). Cf. Stemlight, supra note 12, at 711-12 (footnotes omitted) ("The Court should abandon
its unjustified preference for arbitration and replace it with a policy of acceptance of arbitration
voluntarily agreed to by contracting parties . . . . [and, if not,] Congress must act quickly to
prevent companies from using arbitration as a tool of oppression, rather than to achieve justice.").
18. See Glen R. Fagan, Cole v. Bums: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment-Based Statutory
Claims Gains Momentum, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 501 (1998) (citing Christine K. Biretta,
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Lai: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory
Arbiiration?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 608-13 (1997) (discussing the history of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements and the Supreme Court's growing acceptance of these agreements even
when statutory claims are at issue)); see also Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof):
Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572,
1575 (2000) (explaining, inter alia, "the Supreme Court's initial reluctance to allow individual
statutory claims to be resolved by arbitration").
19. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In voicing its displeasure with
arbitration as a means of resolving statutory claims, the Court stated that "[alrbitral procedures,
while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII." Moore, supra note 18,
at 1576 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56).
20. Moore, supra note 18, at 1576 (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57).
21. Id. (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58).
22. Id. (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58).
23. Id. (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19).
24. Id. at 1577 (footnote omitted).
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The Supreme Court's view essentially remained unchanged until 1985
when the Court, "[i]n a radical departure from prior case law .... ruled
that 'the congressional policy manifested in the [FAA] . . . requires
courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered
by [the] Act.' "25 This holding laid the groundwork for the Court's cur-
rent deference to arbitration agreements and paved the way for the
Court's later holding in Gilmer.
B. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.
In Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)26
could be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement in a securities registration application.27 Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corporation ("Interstate") hired Gilmer as a Manager of Financial
Services in May 1981, and required Gilmer to register as a securities
representative with several stock exchanges. 28  Gilmer's registration
application required, inter alia, that Gilmer "'arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy' arising between him and Interstate 'that is required
to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organi-
zations"' with which he registered, including the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE).29
Gilmer was sixty-two years old when Interstate terminated his
employment in 1987.10 As a result, Gilmer brought suit under the
ADEA alleging that Interstate had wrongfully discharged him due to his
age.3' In response to Gilmer's complaint, Interstate filed a motion to
compel arbitration of the ADEA claim, relying upon the arbitration
clause in Gilmer's registration application, as well as the FAA.32 The
district court denied Interstate's motion, inter alia, on the ground that
"Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver of a
25. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (holding that an arbitration agreement that fell under the auspices of antitrust laws was
enforceable)).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2001).
27. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
28. Id. (citation omitted).
29. Id. (citation omitted). The relevant rule in Gilmer was NYSE Rule 347, which provided
for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative." Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 23-24 (Gilmer brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina.).
32. Id. at 24.
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judicial forum. 3 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
finding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes
of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement
of arbitration agreements. '34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the various circuits regarding the arbitrability
of ADEA claims.35
Following a brief discussion of the history and purpose underlying
the FAA, the Court stated that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement and are therefore enforceable under the FAA. 36
The Court stated that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."37
The Court recognized, however, that arbitration may not be appropriate
for all statutory claims, and that "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate,
the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an inten-
tion to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue."38
Gilmer agreed with the Court that neither the text of the ADEA nor
its legislative history explicitly shows that Congress intended to pre-
clude a waiver of a judicial remedy for ADEA claims, but argued, how-
ever, "that compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims pursuant to
arbitration agreements would be inconsistent with the statutory frame-
work and purposes of the ADEA. ''39 After reviewing the history and
purposes underlying the ADEA, the Court held that federal statutory
claims, particularly claims under the ADEA, may be subject to
mandatory arbitration agreements."n The Court pointed out that "the
mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a
33. Id. (citation omitted) (basing its decision on the Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 (1974)).
34. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990)).
35. Id. (footnote omitted). Prior to the Gilmer case, "every circuit court of appeals to
consider the issue, except for one, had held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
employment claims were unenforceable." Malin, supra note 3, at 589 (citing Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, by 500 U.S. 930 (1991); Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221
(3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988); Cooper v.
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1986); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1990) (Gilmer is the only circuit court holding enforceable a pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate a statutory claim.)).
36. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
37. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
38. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
39. Id. at 26-27.
40. Id. at 27-35.
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statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration."4
It should be noted, however, that the Court reached this conclusion
after an analysis of the arbitration agreement at issue in light of the
NYSE arbitration rules. 2 Gilmer attacked the adequacy of the arbitra-
tion procedures on the following grounds: (1) arbitration panels will be
biased;43 (2) "the discovery allowed in arbitration is more limited than in
the federal courts, which ... will make it difficult to prove discrimina-
tion;"44 (3) arbitrators often do not issue written opinions, resulting "in a
lack of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, an
inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the devel-
opment of the law;"45 (4) the "procedures cannot adequately further the
purposes of the ADEA because they do not provide for broad equitable
relief and class actions; '"46 and (5) there will often be unequal bargain-
ing power between the employer and employee.47
The Court addressed each of these contentions in turn and found
that the NYSE arbitration rules addressed and remedied each of Gil-
mer's concerns. As to the alleged potential bias of the arbitrator, the
Court found that the rules "provide protections against biased panels."48
Concerning the allegation of limited discovery, the Court found that
"[a]lthough those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal
courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and oppor-
tunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.' Next, the Court found that the NYSE rules
overcome Gilmer's argument because they "require that all arbitration
awards be in writing, and that the awards contain the names of the par-
ties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the
41. Id. at 28-29 (pointing out that the Court has previously held that claims brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 may be subject to compulsory
arbitration notwithstanding the fact that both statutes are heavily regulated by the Securities
Exchange Commission) (citing Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
42. Id. at 30-32.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 32-33.
48. Id. at 30. The Court pointed out that the rules require that "the parties be informed of the
employment histories of the arbitrators, and that they be allowed to make further inquiries into the
arbitrators' backgrounds . . . . [and] the arbitrators are required to disclose 'any circumstances
which might preclude [them] from rendering an objective and impartial determination."' Id.
(citations omitted).
49. Id. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)). The Court also pointed out that "an important counterweight to the reduced
discovery in NYSE arbitration is that arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence." Id.
(citation omitted).
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award issued," and that such decisions are made available to the pub-
lic. 50 The Court also held, contrary to Gilmer's allegation, that the
NYSE rules provide for collective proceedings and allow the arbitrator
the power to grant equitable relief.5' Finally, the Court held that there
was no indication in the case that "Gilmer, an experienced businessman,
was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his
registration application .... [and that] this claim of unequal bargaining
power is best left for resolution in specific cases. 52
The impact of the Court's analysis may ultimately be minimal and
the holding may be read narrowly as applying solely to arbitration
claims brought under the NYSE arbitration rules. The Gilmer holding
may be an anomaly in the realm of mandatory arbitration agreements
given the breadth and complexity of the NYSE arbitration rules and the
sophistication of the parties involved in the agreements. The holding, if
applied generally to forced arbitration clauses in employment contracts,
may create problems in future cases wherein the parties are not as
sophisticated, or where the governing arbitration rules do not provide the
myriad protections offered by the NYSE arbitration rules. The uncer-
tainty as to whether the Gilmer decision should be applied as a bright-
line rule, or on a case-by-case basis to protect the needs of a particular
individual, is reflected in various subsequent decisions.
II. How VARIOUS COURTS HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF FEE-
SPLITTING ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN LIGHT OF GILMER.
A. Rulings Against Fee-Splitting or Fee-Shifting Arbitration Clauses.
1. COLE V. BURNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES.
In Cole, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit Court") addressed whether an employer
can condition an employee's employment on acceptance of an arbitra-
tion agreement that requires the employee to arbitrate all disputes, while
also requiring the employee to pay all or part of the arbitrators' fees.53
50. Id. at 31-32 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 33.
53. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Though the
arbitration agreement did not explicitly address the payment of the arbitrators' fees, the court
resolved the ambiguity in the contract against the employer (the drafter of the agreement). Id. at
1468 (footnote omitted). The court stated that "[iit is well understood that, where a contract is
unclear on a point, an interpretation that makes the contract lawful is preferred to one that renders
it unlawful." Id. at 1485 (citing 1010 Potomac Assoc. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d
199, 205 (D.C. 1984) (explaining that a contract "must be interpreted as a whole, giving a
reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all its terms") (emphasis in original); see also Vicki
Bagley Realty, Inc. v. Laufer, 482 A.2d 359, 366 (D.C. 1984) (same); RESTATEMENT OF
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The court held that an employee could not be required to pay arbitrators'
fees to pursue his discrimination claims because the fees would discour-
age such an action and prevent the employee from vindicating his statu-
tory rights.54
The parties in Cole stipulated that the cost of an arbitrator would
range from $500 to $1,000 or more a day. The D.C. Circuit Court
stated that "[e]ven if an employee is not required to pay any portion of
an arbitrator's fee, arbitration ...is hardly inexpensive," pointing out
that under a plan by the American Arbitration Association (AAA), an
employee could be required to pay a filing fee of $500.00, administra-
tive fees of $150.00 per day, room rental fees, court reporter fees, and
attorneys' fees if the individual employs an attorney.5 6 The court stated
that it would be unacceptable for certain plaintiffs "to pay arbitrators'
fees, because such fees are unlike anything that [they] would have to pay
to pursue [their] statutory claims in court."57 The court concluded that
"where arbitration has been imposed by the employer and occurs only at
the option of the employer-arbitrators' fees should be borne solely by
the employer. "58
The Cole Court based its holding on Gilmer, wherein "the Supreme
Court endorsed a system of arbitration in which employees are not
required to pay for the arbitrator assigned to hear their statutory
CONTRACTS § 236 (1925)). The court also pointed out that "[ift is also accepted that
ambiguous provisions are construed against the drafter of the contract, in this case, Bums." Cole,
105 F.3d at 1486. (citation omitted).
54. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-84. The court "use[d] the term 'arbitrators' fees' to include not
only the arbitrator's honorarium, but also the arbitrator's expenses and any other costs associated
with the arbitrator's services." Id. at 1484 n.15.
55. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). The court cited the following in accepting the figures
stipulated by the parties: (1) information provided by AAA, which cited $700 per day as the
average arbitrator's fee; (2) a JAMS/Endispute estimated rate for an arbitrator of an average of
$400 per hour; (3) a Wall Street Journal article stating that fees of $500 or $600 per hour are not
uncommon; (4) the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution's estimate that arbitrators' fees run
between $250 and $350 per hour. Id. at 1480 n.8 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 1484 n.12. The court acknowledged that parties appearing in federal court may also
be required to assume the cost of filing fees and other administrative expenses, and opined that
any such costs of that sort relative to arbitration would not be "problematic." Id. at 1484 (footnote
omitted).
57. Id. at 1484 (footnote omitted). The court quoted a corporate director of industrial
relations at Northrop explaining why Northrop pays the costs of an arbitrator: "[W]e bear the cost
of the arbitration for the very practical reason that most of the employees who seek arbitration of
their grievances simply couldn't afford it if we did not." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing DAVID W.
EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE NONUNION WORKPLACE 291
(1989)).
58. Id. at 1485. The court also stated that "an employee can never be required, as a condition
of employment, to pay an arbitrator's compensation in order to secure the resolution of statutory
claims under Title VII (any more than an employee can be made to pay a judge's salary)." Id. at
1468.
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claims."59 The D.C. Circuit Court opined that the Gilmer Court would
not have ruled the way it did in the absence of the provision requiring
the employer to pay for the arbitrator's fees. 60 The Cole Court noted an
"unaware[ness] of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a
beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay for the services
of the judge assigned to hear her or his case. Under Gilmer, arbitration
is supposed to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum."'" The
court concluded that "it would undermine Congress's intent to prevent
employees who are seeking to vindicate statutory rights from gaining
access to a judicial forum and then require them to pay for the services
of an arbitrator when they would never be required to pay for a judge in
court."
62
2. SHANKLE V. B-G MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT OF COLORADO, INC.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Shankle found unenforceable an
arbitration agreement that required an employee to pay for one-half of
the arbitrator's fees.63 The parties in Shankle had submitted their claims
to the Judicial Arbiter Group, Inc., which detailed the costs of the pro-
posed arbitration as follows: "the arbiter charges $250.00 per each hour
of arbiter time and travel time at $125.00 per hour, and where appropri-
ate, $45.00 for each hour of paralegal support time."64 The court esti-
mated that arbitration would have cost the employee between $1,875.00
and $5,000.00 to resolve his claims. 65
In reaching a decision, the court stated that the agreement placed
the plaintiff "between the proverbial rock and a hard place, [as the
agreement] prohibited use of the judicial forum, where a litigant is not
required to pay for a judge's services, and the prohibitive cost substan-
tially limited use of the arbitral forum. '66 The Tenth Circuit additionally
59. Id. at 1484.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. Of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a mandatory arbitration agreement, which is entered into by an employee as a
condition of continued employment, and which requires the employee to pay a portion of the
arbitrator's fees, is unenforceable under the FAA).
64. Id. at 1232. The Judicial Arbiter Group, Inc. also required the parties to pay a $6,000.00
deposit. Id.
65. Id. at 1234 (footnote omitted) (citing Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105
F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997), for the proposition that, in estimating the total costs of
arbitration for the employee, the typical employment case averages between fifteen to forty hours
of arbitration time).
66. Id. at 1235 (citation omitted) (noting that the clause required the plaintiff "to agree to
mandatory arbitration as a term of continued employment, yet failed to provide an accessible
forum in which he could resolve his statutory rights").
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stated that "an arbitration agreement that prohibits use of the judicial
forum as a means of resolving statutory claims must also provide for an
effective and accessible alternative forum."67
3. JONES V. FUJITSU NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
In Jones, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas held unenforceable a fee-splitting provision of an arbitration
policy contained in an employee's employment agreement.68 The plain-
tiff, alleging a violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), had
agreed to the modified arbitration policy in his employment agreement
as a condition of continued employment with the defendant.69 The pol-
icy required the plaintiff to pay one-half of the arbitrator's fee, the court
reporter's fee, the fee for the arbitrator's copy of the transcript, and facil-
ity coStS. 7° The plaintiff argued that if the arbitration lasted an "aver-
age" length of time, he would have to pay between $1,875 and $7,000 to
resolve his FMLA claim, an amount he was unable to afford.7 ' The
employer argued that the arbitrator could essentially shift the fees by
awarding the employee the costs of arbitration if the employee was suc-
cessful on the merits.72 The court found that Jones, a former worker in
Rockwell's shipping department, could not afford such costs.73
The court noted that the arbitration policy prohibited the plaintiff
from using the judicial forum, while at the same time, the prohibitive
arbitration costs substantially limited the plaintiff's use of the arbitral
forum. 74  Consequently, the court held unenforceable the fee-splitting
provision of the policy because the provision "failed to provide an
accessible alternative for Plaintiff to present his statutory claims," noting
67. Id. at 1234 (footnote omitted). Noting, however, that "[t]he arbitral forum, in most cases,
is such an alternative." Id. at 1234 n.3 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 26-33 (1991); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th
Cir. 1994) ("concluding that Title VII claims are subject to compulsory arbitration")).
68. Jones v. Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693 (N.D. Tex.
1999).
69. Id. at 689. The plaintiff alleged that he was terminated by the defendant after requesting a
medical leave of absence. Id.
70. Id. at 693.
71. Id. (footnote omitted). The court relied on Cole v. Burns International Security Services,
for the verification of plaintiffs claim, stating, "CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution estimates
that arbitrators' fees of $250-$350 per hour and 15-40 hours of arbitrator time in a typical
employment case [would result in] total arbitrators' fees of $3,750 to $14,000." Id. at 693 n.4
(quoting Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
72. Id. at 693.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court, relying on Shankle, refuted the argument stating, "it is unlikely that an
employee will risk advancing those fees to access the arbitral forum when faced with a mere
possibility of being reimbursed." Id. (citing Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. Of Colo., Inc., 163
F.3d 1230, 1235 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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"that if employees are required to pay arbitral fees in addition to the
administrative costs and attorney fees ... many employees will be una-
ble to pursue statutory claims.""
B. Courts that Have Held Fee-Splitting Clauses Enforceable.
1. WILLIAMS V. CIGNA FINANCIAL ADVISORS, INC.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of a fee-splitting clause in
Williams, and refused to follow the conclusion reached by the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court in Cole.76 Cigna hired Williams as a registered representative
in 1987 and required that Williams register with the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) as a condition of his employment. 77
In the process, Williams signed a form which provided that "any dis-
pute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm ... is
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the
organization with which I register. '78 In 1993, Williams was discharged
and he subsequently filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that Cigna discriminated
against him in violation of the ADEA.79 Cigna prevailed at arbitration
and on appeal in the district court, whereupon Williams appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.8"
On appeal, Williams argued, inter alia, that the arbitrators' order
that he pay one-half of the forum fees, $3,150,8" is contrary to public
policy, relying on the D.C. Circuit Court's interpretation of Gilmer "as
holding implicitly that as a matter of law ADEA claimants may not be
forced to pay any part of arbitrators' fees and expenses. '82  The Fifth
75. Id. (citing Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484) (concluding that "such result clearly undermines the
deterrent function of the FMLA").
76. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 763 (5th Cir. 1999).
77. Id. at 755.
78. Id. The form was a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer
(U-4 Form). Id.
79. Id. In 1993, Williams, at the age of sixty-three, had the lowest sales of similarly situated
agents, and owed Cigna $29,613 for advances and a loan. Id. Williams was given the option of
either: (1) reducing his debt in the amount of $18,000 to remain an active agent; (2) retiring; or
(3) face termination. Id. Williams refused to retire and would not accept any of the other options
offered. Id.
80. Id. at 756-57 (citation omitted). Williams obtained a right to sue letter from the EEOC
and brought suit against Cigna in state court. Id. at 756. Cigna removed the case to federal court
and obtained a stay pending arbitration. Id. The district court denied William's claims and
awarded Cigna $18,945 on its counterclaim. Id. at 756-57.
81. Pursuant to the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Williams was required to pay a
$500 non-refundable filing fee and a $1,500 hearing session deposit prior to the arbitration
hearing. Id. at 764. In addition, the forum fees were assessed at a rate of $1,500 per hour for four
hours, plus $300 for each pre-hearing conference, totaling costs of $6,300-half of which was
assessed to Williams. Id.
82. Id. at 763 (citing Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-86 (D.C. Cir.
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Circuit Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit Court's interpretation, stat-
ing, "Gilmer does not so clearly imply that no part of arbitral forum fees
may ever be assessed against federal anti-discrimination claimants,
although it plainly indicates that an arbitral cost allocation scheme may
not be used to prevent effective vindication of federal statutory
claims."83 The court further stated that, in fact, Gilmer didn't address
the question "whether an arbitration forum that requires an ADEA
claimant to pay all or part of the arbitrators' compensation can be an
adequate substitute for a judicial forum."84
The court held that Williams did not show that the arbitrators' order
"prevented him from having a full opportunity to vindicate his claims
effectively or prevented the arbitration proceedings from affording him
an adequate substitute for a federal judicial forum."85 The court
affirmed the district court's decision upholding the arbitrators' award,
concluding that the evidence in the case did not show that the costs were
prohibitively expensive to Williams, nor that the prospect of incurring
such costs "hampered or discouraged" him from bringing his claim.86
Finally, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the instant case did "not call
upon [the court] to address the serious question of whether the legisla-
tive intent of employees' anti-discrimination statutes in general is under-
mined by the effects of mandatory arbitration and arbitrators' fees."87
2. BRADFORD V. ROCKWELL SEMICONDUCTOR SYSTEMS, INC.
In Bradford, the Fourth Circuit held unenforceable a mandatory
employment agreement that contained a fee-splitting provision.88 The
employment agreement contained an arbitration clause that provided in
pertinent part: "To ensure that the Arbitrator is not biased in any way in
favor of one party because that party is paying all or most of the Arbitra-
tion fees and costs, the parties shall share equally the fees and costs of
1997); accord Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.
1999)).
83. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
84. Id. at 764. The court observed that although Gilmer did not include a complaint about
arbitration costs, the Gilmer Court delineated some of the basic principles underlying the
enforceability of arbitration contracts and procedures. id. (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 764-65 ("Williams testified that ... his 'income so far this year is excess of six
figures.' ").
87. Id. (basing the conclusion on the fact that employment discrimination claims arising after
January 1, 1999 may be filed in state or federal court because of NASD's rule change abolishing
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims). Id.
88. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 559 (4th Cir. 2001).
Bradford brought suit alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his age and was
wrongfully terminated as a result. Id. at 551.
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the Arbitrator."89 Bradford argued that such clauses "render arbitration
agreements unenforceable as a matter of law because, by requiring
employees to pay part or all of the arbitration costs, such provisions
deter employees who have been victims of discrimination from pursuing
their rights, thus undermining the remedial and deterrent purposes of the
federal anti-discrimination statutes." '9 Bradford requested that the court
adopt a per se rule that all arbitration agreements containing fee-splitting
provisions are unenforceable, based not on a particular plaintiff's actual
deterrence, but rather on the overall deterrent effects. 9'
The Fourth Circuit noted that "some courts have concluded that
fee-splitting provisions render arbitration agreements unenforceable
because the cost of fee splitting deters or prevents employees from vin-
dicating their statutory rights in arbitral forums."92 The court then
pointed out that other courts, however, have declined to hold arbitration
agreements unenforceable merely because they contain fee-splitting pro-
visions.93 After acknowledging the conflicting holdings as to the "extent
to which fee splitting automatically renders an arbitration agreement
unenforceable even absent any showing of individual hardship or deter-
rence," the court concluded that it "is undisputed that fee splitting can
render an arbitration agreement unenforceable where the arbitration fees
and costs are so prohibitive as to effectively deny the employee access to
the arbitral forum. 94
The court then focused its analysis on whether it should apply a
case-by-case methodology to determine if a fee-splitting clause is unen-
forceable, or whether it should adopt a broad per se rule against all fee-
89. Id. at 551. The agreement also contained a provision that each party was to pay for its
own costs and attorney's fees. Id.
90. Id. at 552 (footnote omitted) (Bradford brought suit under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.).
91. Id. This request was most likely in response to the district court's earlier conclusion "that
Bradford had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable against him because he had failed to offer any competent evidence that fee splitting
would cause him financial hardship." Id. (footnote omitted) ("The district court assumed for the
purpose of its analysis that a proper showing of financial hardship could render an arbitration
agreement unenforceable.").
92. Id. at 553 (citing Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th
Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
93. Id. (citing Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1999);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1999)
("refusing to invalidate arbitration scheme simply because of the possibility that the arbitrator
would charge the plaintiffs a forum fee 'which may be as high as $3,000 per day and tens of
thousands of dollars per case,' because, among other reasons, 'arbitration is often far more
affordable to plaintiffs and defendants alike than is pursuing a claim in court' "); Koveleskie v.
SBC Capital Mkts, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Arakawa v. Japan Network
Group, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same) (footnote omitted)).
94. Id. at 553-54 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)).
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splitting provisions (as argued by Bradford)." Relying on the reasoning
of Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc.,96 and Green Tree Finan-
cial Corp., the court concluded that a case-by case basis is more appro-
priate, holding that "the crucial inquiry . . . is whether the particular
claimant has an adequate and accessible substitute forum in which to
resolve his statutory rights," and that a fee-splitting provision does not
necessarily deprive a claimant of such a forum.97
III. GREEN TREE FINANCIAL CORP.-ALABAMA V. RANDOLPH.
A. Factual Background.
Larketta Randolph brought suit against Green Tree Financial Cor-
poration-Alabama and Green Tree Financial Corporation (collectively,
"Green Tree"), which financed the purchase of her mobile home.98 Ran-
dolph alleged that Green Tree's financing documents violated the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA),99 that its mandatory arbitration requirement'00
violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 1 1 and that TILA precludes
the arbitration of disputes arising under that legislation."12
Randolph's action arose from her purchase of a mobile home from
95. Id. at 554. (noting that Bradford's argument rested primarily upon the D.C. Circuit
Court's decision in Cole.).
96. See Williams, 197 F.3d at 764 ("focusing upon the inability to pay; whether the forum
fees created a prohibitive expense; whether Williams had a full opportunity to vindicate his
claims; and whether the forum fees prevented the arbitral forum from providing an adequate
substitute for the judicial forum").
97. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556-59.
98. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 178 F.3d 1149, 1150 (11th Cir. 1999).
99. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2001).
100. The arbitration provision provided in pertinent part:
All disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the
relationships which result from this Contract, or the validity of this arbitration
clause or the entire contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration . . . . This
arbitration Contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C.A. Section 1 .... The
parties agree and understand that they choose arbitration instead of litigation to
resolve disputes. The parties understand that they have a right or opportunity to
litigate disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve their disputes
through arbitration, except as provided herein. THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY
AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL
EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR
PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS PROVIDED
HEREIN). The parties agree and understand that all disputes arising under case
law, statutory law, and all other laws including, but not limited to, all contract, tort
and property disputes will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with this
Contract.
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (2001).
102. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1150-51.
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Better Cents Home Builders, Inc., on January 25, 1994.103 The purchase
was financed through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Green Tree Financial Corporation. 10 4 The financ-
ing documents required Randolph to obtain "vendor's single interest"
insurance, which protects a vendor or lienholder against the costs of
repossession in the event of default. 1 5 There was a fifteen dollar charge
for this insurance, but the documents did not list the amount as a finance
charge in its Truth in Lending Act disclosure. 0 6
B. The District Court Decision.
Randolph brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama in January, 1996, alleging that Green Tree
violated TILA by failing to include vendor's single interest insurance in
its TILA disclosure, and violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by
requiring arbitration of all claims. 107 Additionally, Randolph sought
class certification for all individuals who had entered into similar agree-
ments with Green Tree.' 08 Green Tree, in lieu of an answer, moved to
compel Randolph to arbitrate her complaint pursuant to the arbitration
clause in her financing contract. 109 Green Tree also moved to stay the
action pending arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action.1"0
The district court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, declined
to certify a class, and dismissed the action with prejudice.'
C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Randolph appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
Green Tree moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction." 2
Green Tree argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction on the
ground that the district court's order was not appealable as a "final deci-
sion."' 11 The Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the
district court's order under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration
Act, which allows appeal from "a final decision with respect to an arbi-
tration that is subject to this title."' 14
103. Id. at 1151.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
107. Id. at 1413.
108. Id. at 1413-14.
109. Id. at 1414.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1414, 1424.
112. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 178 F.3d 1149, 1152 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
113. Id. at 1153.
114. Id. at 1152-57. The Court determined that an appealable "final decision" under 9 U.S.C.
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The Eleventh Circuit next addressed whether the arbitration clause
in the retail installment agreement signed by Randolph was enforcea-
ble. 1 5 The court, acknowledging the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, held the clause unenforceable because it failed to provide the
minimum guarantees required to ensure that Randolph could vindicate
her statutory rights under TILA. 116 The court stated that "some procedu-
ral flaws present such barriers to a would-be litigant's exercise of his or
her statutory rights that they render an arbitration clause unenforce-
able."' 17 The court reasoned that "[w]hen an arbitration clause has pro-
visions that defeat the remedial purpose of [a] statute .... the arbitration
clause is not enforceable." '118 Specifically, the court felt that "forcing a
plaintiff to bear the brunt of 'hefty' arbitration costs and 'steep filing
fees' constitutes 'a legitimate basis for a conclusion that the [arbitration]
clause does not comport with statutory policy.""1 9
The court stated that the clause in the Green Tree contract "raises
serious concerns with respect to filing fees, arbitrators' costs and other
arbitration expenses," as the clause failed to: (1) mention anything about
the payment of filing fees or apportionment of arbitration costs; (2)
assign initial responsibility for filing fees or costs; (3) provide for a
waiver in cases of financial hardship; and (4) say whether consumers
would nonetheless be saddled with fees and costs in excess of any award
if they prevailed. 120 The court also stated that the clause was inadequate
because it failed to provide whether AAA rules would apply to the pro-
ceeding, whether some other set of rules apply, or whether the parties
were free to negotiate their own set of rules.' 2 ' Consequently, the court
held that the arbitration agreement's silence regarding the aforemen-
tioned issues rendered the clause unenforceable "because it fails to pro-
vide the minimum guarantees required to ensure that Randolph's ability
to vindicate her statutory rights will not be undone by steep filing fees,
steep arbitrators' fees, or other high costs of arbitration."' 122 Therefore,
the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for
§ 16(a)(3) is one that effectively dismisses all the claims pending by issuing an order compelling
arbitration. Id. at 1156. The court found that "the district court's dismissal of Randolph's action
with prejudice left it with 'nothing ... to do but execute the judgment,"' and therefore was within
the definition of a "final decision" under the FAA. Id. at 1156-57 (quoting Morewitz v. W. of
Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1361 (1 1th Cir. 1995)).
115. Id. at 1157.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.
1998) (citation omitted)).
119. Id. (quoting Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062) (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 1158.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 123
D. The Supreme Court Decision.
The Supreme Court granted Green Tree's writ of certiorari and
heard oral argument on October 3, 2000.124 As to the first issue, the
Court held that where the district court orders parties to proceed to arbi-
tration and dismisses the claims before it, that decision is "final" within
the meaning of § 16(a)(3), and therefore appealable. 125
The Court next addressed "whether Randolph's agreement to arbi-
trate is unenforceable because it says nothing about the costs of arbitra-
tion, and thus fails to provide her protection from potentially substantial
costs of pursuing her federal statutory claims in the arbitral forum."' 12 6
The Court acknowledged that the Federal Arbitration Act's purpose is
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
... and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts."'' 27 Further, the Court stated that it has "recognized that fed-
eral statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration,
and [that it has] enforced agreements to arbitrate that involve such
claims."' 28 The Court also pointed out that it has "rejected generalized
attacks on arbitration that rest on 'suspicion of arbitration as a method of
weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants.' ",129 Finally, "claims arising under a statute designed to
further important social policies may be arbitrated because 'so long as
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum,' the statute serves its functions."' 3 °
123. Id. at 1159.
124. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
125. Id. at 89. Green Tree argued that the phrase "final decision" did not include "an order
compelling arbitration and dismissing the other claims in an action, when that order occurs in an
'embedded' proceeding," such as the instant situation. Id. at 87 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 26).
The court distinguished "embedded" proceedings from "independent" proceedings by stating that
"embedded" proceedings are "those actions involving both a request for arbitration and other
claims for relief," whereas "'[i]ndependent' proceedings, by contrast, are actions in which a
request to order arbitration is the sole issue before the court." Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 89.
127. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (holding that
"a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ... can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application"). Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 23.
128. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 89 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Sherman
Act)).
129. Id. at 89-90 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481).
130. Id. at 90 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).
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In determining whether the statutory claims at issue may be arbi-
trated, the Court looked to whether the parties had agreed to submit their
claims to arbitration and "whether Congress has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue. '  The Court found that the parties had clearly agreed to arbi-
trate all claims relating to their contract, and that Randolph did not argue
that TILA evinces an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial reme-
dies.I32 The Court stated that Randolph's contention was that the silence
of the arbitration agreement with respect to costs and fees created a
"risk" that she would be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs if
she pursued her claims in an arbitral forum, thereby making her "unable
to vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration."' 33 Randolph argued,
inter alia, that "[c]osts are virtually unique in their power to discourage
parties from exercising their rights."' 34 The Court acknowledged that
although the existence of large arbitration costs could possibly preclude
a claimant from effectively vindicating her statutory rights in the arbitral
forum, the record here, however, failed to show that Randolph would
bear such costs if she went to arbitration.'
35
The Court ruled that while the record revealed the arbitration agree-
ment's silence as to the cost of arbitration, that silence alone was insuffi-
cient to render the agreement unenforceable.' 36 Additionally, "[t]he
'risk' that Randolph may be saddled with prohibitive costs is too specu-
lative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement,"'' 37 and an
invalidation "on that basis would undermine the 'liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.' 138 The Court concluded that where a
party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, as in the instant situation,
that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of such costs.
1 39
The Court, however, refused to address "[h]ow detailed the showing of
prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must
come forward with contrary evidence."' 40 In a five to four majority, the
131. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Brief for Respondent at 31, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No.
99-1235).
135. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90. The Court pointed out that the record "contains hardly any
information on the matter." Id. (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 91.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1980)).
139. Id. at 92.
140. Id. (stating that it was not necessary to address the issue, "for in this case neither during
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Court held that the court of appeals erred in deciding that the arbitration
agreement's silence with respect to costs and fees rendered it
unenforceable.14'
Justice Ginsburg's dissent pointed out that "[i]n these circum-
stances, it is hardly clear that Randolph should bear the burden of dem-
onstrating up front the arbitral forum's inaccessibility, or that she should
be required to submit to arbitration without knowing how much it will
cost her."' 42 Ginsburg stated that the Court should vacate and remand
the case for further consideration of the accessibility of the arbitral
forum to Randolph.'
IV. THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION.
AAA, a not-for-profit, public service organization, is the largest
provider of dispute resolution services in the world.' 44 AAA filed an
amicus curiae brief in Green Tree addressing whether Randolph's agree-
ment to arbitrate was unenforceable because it said nothing about the
costs of arbitration, thereby possibly failing to protect her from the
potentially substantial costs of pursuing her federal statutory claims in
the arbitral forum.' 45 AAA sympathized with the Eleventh Circuit's
concern that the consumer's "ability to vindicate her statutory rights
[could] be undone by steep filing fees, steep arbitrators' fees or other
high costs of arbitration,"'' 46 but felt that the Court "gave insufficient
weight to the national policy favoring the enforcement of arbitral
agreements." 147
In 1997, AAA made an attempt to deal with the growing concerns
over the high costs of arbitration, such as those expressed by the Elev-
enth Circuit, by convening a National Consumer Disputes Advisory
discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits was there any timely showing at all on
the point").
141. Id. at 92 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Arbitration Association at 2, Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
145. Id. at 3. The AAA interpreted the decision of the Eleventh Circuit as "to assume that
arbitration is somehow second class justice, or at least that it imposes substantially greater
hardships on litigants that those they face when they pursue litigation in a judicial forum," and
responded "that justice is not diminished in properly conducted arbitration proceedings." Id. at 5.
146. Id. at 6. (citing Pet. App. 18a.) (stating that "[h]igh filing and arbitrator fees can certainly
present a problem in cases involving relatively small claims").
147. Id. at 7 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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Committee (the "Committee"). 4 8 In April 1998, the Committee pub-
lished A Due Process Protocol for the Mediation and Arbitration of
Consumer Disputes4 9 (the "Protocol") that in part, addressed the ques-
tion of costs.' 50  One of the cost provisions states: "Consumer ADR
Agreements should make it clear that all parties retain the right to seek
relief in a small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope of
its jurisdiction." 151
Subsequent to the publishing of the Protocol, AAA adopted a set of
rules implementing the work of the Committee, known as AAA's Arbi-
tration Rules for the Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes (the
"Consumer Arbitration Rules").' 52 Additionally, AAA "decided, as a
matter of internal policy, that all consumer disputes to be administered
by the AAA involving claims for less than $10,000 will be processed
under the Consumer Arbitration Rules, regardless of the rules, terms and
conditions reflected in a pre-dispute clause."' 53 Furthermore, AAA's
Consumer Arbitration Rules do not require a consumer filing fee, limit
the consumer's share of the arbitrator's fees to $125, and require that the
business party pay all other fees and costs. 154
Addressing whether the silent arbitration clause in Green Tree was
enforceable, AAA argued that the Eleventh Circuit should have followed
the lead of the D.C. Circuit Court in Cole and treated the silence in the
arbitration agreement as an ambiguity to be construed against Green
Tree (the drafter of the agreement), thereby requiring Green Tree to pay
all the arbitration costs. 55 AAA contended that this approach would not
148. Id. at 3. ("The Advisory Committee included persons affiliated with consumer groups,
such as Consumers Union and the American Association of Retired Persons, state government
consumer-protection professionals, representatives of businesses that deal directly with
consumers, academics, and dispute resolution professionals.").
149. Id. at 3-4 (stressing "the importance of a fundamentally fair process, access to
information, independence and impartiality of both the arbitrator and the administering
organization, availability of a full range of remedies, a reasonable location for the hearing, and
reasonable time limits").
150. Id. at 4. The principle concerning costs is as follows: "[P]roviders of goods and services
should develop ADR programs which entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the
circumstances of the dispute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the
nature of goods or services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay." Id. (citation
omitted).
151. Id. (citations omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 15-16. Noting that a filing fee of $150 is required to file a case in federal court,
citing 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2000). Id. at 16 n.13.
155. Id. at 19 (citations omitted). AAA acknowledged that the arbitration agreement was
flawed because the clause failed "to specify the rules to be applied, the place of arbitration, or
(failing designation of a set of rules that would do so) how the expenses of the arbitration are to be
paid," but noted, however, that such deficiencies "may be supplied by subsequent agreement of
the parties or, in the absence of such agreement, by the arbitrator once appointed or by a
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have conflicted with the remedial and deterrent purposes of either TILA
or the Equal Credit Act, and that it "would have enabled Respondent to
vindicate her statutory rights in the agreed forum."' 156 AAA urged the
Supreme Court to construe the Green Tree agreement to make its
enforcement lawful, arguing that such a result is dictated by principles of
contract law. 157 AAA further argued that contract law requires such an
interpretation, particularly where, as here, the ambiguity in the arbitra-
tion agreement "is susceptible to one interpretation that will bring it into
conflict with the statute under which a claim is brought, and to another
interpretation that will reconcile the purpose of that statute with the
mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act .... ,1
V. CONCLUSION.
The Supreme Court erred in advancing a case-by-case approach to
whether a plaintiff is able to afford the costs of arbitration. It seems
incongruous that the Court has adopted a methodology wherein a claim-
ant has to litigate to prove that he or she cannot afford to arbitrate. A
more suitable approach would follow the holding of Cole, which opined
that an employer should carry the burden of paying for arbitrators' fees
in a mandatory arbitration agreement. At a minimum, Congress should
amend the FAA to incorporate the procedures currently utilized by AAA
in its Consumer Arbitration Rules. Although the Consumer Arbitration
Rules adopted by AAA apply only to consumer transactions, Congress
could expand and adopt the rules making them applicable to any and all
disputes concerning a pre-arbitration clause between an individual and a
business. A potential claimant would then have the option of: (1) taking
the case to small claims court, bypassing arbitration completely, or if
that is not applicable; (2) proceeding to arbitration knowing that their
cost of arbitration will be limited to $125 (which is less expensive than
the costs of filing a claim in federal court).' 59 The costs of arbitration
would then be shouldered by the party most able to afford such costs,
i.e., the business, which is also reaping the supposed benefits of arbitrat-
ing rather than litigating. This approach would offer a bright-line solu-
tion to the current controversies, thereby taking the matter out of the
supervising court." Id. at 12 (citing Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709,
711, 716 (7th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted) ("holding that arbitration provision which stated only
that 'disputes under this transaction shall be arbitrated' was not too vague to be enforced, because
the court was able to supply 'such implementing details as who the arbitrators would be, where
arbitration would take place, and what procedures would govern"')).
156. Id. at 20 (footnotes and citations omitted).
157. Id. at 21.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 154.
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hands of the courts, while protecting consumers in the process. Either
method would uphold the Supreme Court's current liberal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements while also allowing claimants to vindicate
their statutory rights.
In the aftermath of Green Tree, the question remains whether
courts will continue to follow the liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion agreements. The decision also raises the question of whether the
cumulative cost savings of arbitration to businesses will outweigh the
sometimes prohibitive costs to the individual. If not, and if the courts
perform the analysis on a case-by-case basis, as the Green Tree holding
suggests, it will likely lead to a high degree of uncertainty among poten-
tial plaintiffs. This uncertainty could result in more litigation, an ironic
result given the policy considerations favoring arbitration. The goal of
arbitration as a less expensive, quicker alternative to the judicial forum
is not furthered if plaintiffs are forced to litigate whether or not they are
able to arbitrate. Green Tree seems to have once again opened the door
to allowing courts to disfavor arbitration if they, on a case-by-case basis,
decide that the benefits of overall cost-savings to businesses are out-
weighed by the prohibitive costs to particular plaintiffs.
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